Chicago Journal of International Law
Volume 17

Number 1

Article 8

7-1-2016

Proportionality in Customary International Law: An Argument
Against Aspirational Laws of War
James Kilcup

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil

Recommended Citation
Kilcup, James (2016) "Proportionality in Customary International Law: An Argument Against Aspirational
Laws of War," Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 17: No. 1, Article 8.
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol17/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Chicago Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please
contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Proportionality in Customary International Law: An
Argument Against Aspirational Laws of War
James Kilcup

Abstract
The principle of proportionality is a central feature of international law regulating modern
military engagements. Yet the legal status of proportionality in international law is far from clear.
Two major international treaties—the Rome Statute and the 1978 Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Convention—address war crimes and provide distinct definitions of the crime of
disproportionate use of force. Many of the world’s major military powers are not signatories to
either treaty. Consequently, the only framework of legal accountability for alleged proportionality
violations committed by those nations is customary international law. Furthermore, in noninternational conflicts no treaty law respecting proportionality exists, meaning that customary
international law again is the only binding law available. Given the importance of the definition
of proportionality to policing modern military conflicts, reducing ambiguity regarding the legal
elements of proportionality would be a salutary development. This Comment, drawing on
doctrinal and realist policy analyses, argues that the legal elements of proportionality in customary
international law can be clarified through the adoption of the definition of proportionality provided
by the Rome Statute as customary international law.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
Entertain the following hypothetical: The year is 2020 and Bashar Al-Assad
has been removed from power. Syria is governed by a nascent democratic regime.
In an effort to prevent destabilizing recriminations by the now ascendant Sunni
population against Assad’s Shiite sympathizers, the United Nations Security
Council passes a resolution calling for the creation of an international tribunal for
the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in Syrian territory since 2011.1 As the tribunal
canvasses the claims that require adjudication, one of the most frequently
recurring alleged violations of international humanitarian law is the use of
disproportionate force.2 In the process of adjudicating these alleged violations, the
jurists on this International Criminal Tribunal are tasked with giving legal content
to the war crime of disproportionate force. Searching for the applicable definition
of proportionality, the tribunal will find itself facing little in the way of settled law.
No positive international law with respect to proportionality applies to crimes
committed during the conflict.3 Syria is not a signatory to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute).4 Moreover, the prohibition of
disproportionate force in the 1978 Additional Protocol I of the Geneva
Conventions (AP I) is inapplicable to intrastate conflicts.5 Consequently, the
tribunal will have to determine what, if any, customary international law (CIL) of

1

Modeled after the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

2

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2015: SYRIA, https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2015/country-chapters/syria (last visited Feb. 16, 2016)(“Between February and July [of
2014], there were over 650 new major impact strikes in Aleppo neighborhoods held by armed
opposition groups. Most of the strikes had damage consistent with barrel bomb detonations. One
local group estimated that aerial attacks had killed 3,557 civilians in Aleppo governorate in 2014.”).
Assuming there is no ICC referral by the Security Council. In the case of referrals, ICC law applies
irrespective of the signatory status of the referred nation. This is why Sudan was legally obligated
to cooperate with the ICC’s order to arrest Al Bashir despite its not being a signatory to the Rome
Statute. See Dapo Akande, Legal Nature of ICC referrals to the ICC and Its Impact on Al Bashir’s Immunities,
7 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 333, 335 (2009).

3

4

5

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1988). States
Parties to the Rome Statute—Asia-Pacific States, https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states
%20parties/asian%20states/Pages/asian%20states.aspx (last visited, Feb. 16, 2016);
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter
“Rome Statute”].
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter “AP I”] and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; see also William Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional
Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 98 (1982).
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proportionality can be applied to the Syrian conflict. Because case law on the
subject is sparse,6 the tribunal will likely face a matter of first impression.7
This hypothetical illustrates the importance that proportionality as CIL may
have for the adjudication of international law. It also underscores that
proportionality as a matter of CIL is in need of clarification. This Comment
provides an answer to the question that the hypothetical tribunal would face. The
definition of proportionality under CIL that should be adopted is proportionality
as it is defined in the Rome Statute, as opposed to the definition provided in AP
I of the Geneva Convention.
The central thesis of this Comment is that the Rome Statute definition of
proportionality is preferable on doctrinal, realist, and policy grounds. Because the
legal status of proportionality is particularly important in the context of human
shields and warfare against non-uniformed insurgencies, emphasis is placed on the
strength of the Rome Statute definition of proportionality in maintaining the
credibility of the laws of armed conflict while allowing for the effective and
humane prosecution of modern asymmetrical war.
The Comment proceeds as follows: Section II describes the current
international regime of proportionality, both in terms of CIL and positive
international law and concludes with a survey of the various options a hypothetical
tribunal would have before it as it considers the question of proportionality as
CIL. Section III establishes the meaningful differences between the definitions of
proportionality in the AP I and Rome Statute. Section IV argues—on doctrinal,
realist, and policy grounds—that the Rome Statute definition of the war crime of
disproportionate force should be adopted as CIL.

II. B ACKGROUND
Proportionality is a moral and legal norm that forms one part, along with the
principles of distinction and necessity, of the holy triad of the modern law of
armed conflict.8 Contrary to popular misunderstandings,9 proportionality is not a
6

7

See Rogier Bartels, Dealing with the Principle of Proportionality in Armed Conflict in Retrospect: The Application
of the Principle in International Criminal Trials, 46 ISR. L. REV. 271, 272 (2013) (pointing out that “no
case law exists to which the International Criminal Court (ICC) . . . could turn were it to be seized
of a case concerning alleged disproportionate attacks”).
This situation is not entirely hypothetical. Sri Lanka is, as of this writing, grappling with the process
of establishing such a tribunal. Like Syria, Sri Lanka’s conflict with the Tamil Tigers was intrastate
and Sri Lanka is a signatory to neither AP I nor the Rome Statute.

8

Robert D. Sloane, Puzzles of Proportion and the “Reasonable Military Commander”: Reflections on the Law,
Ethics, and Geopolitics of Proportionality, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 299, 310 (2015).

9

See, for example, Eugene Robinson, It’s Disproportionate . . ., WASH. POST, (July 25, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/24/AR2006072400810
_pf.html.
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principle that limits the number of casualties one party can inflict on the other
party by reference to the number of casualties they have suffered. In principle, it
is entirely possible for a party that has suffered no casualties to engage in a
proportional strike that results in the death of hundreds or thousands of casualties.
Proportionality, rightly understood, is a principle that limits the acceptable amount
of destructive secondary (non-targeted) effects an attack can produce given the
anticipated military advantage from the attack. Secondary effects can include both
traditional collateral damage, as well as more attenuated effects of an attack, such
as power outages or environmental devastation.10 Although proportionality is
sometimes seen as a logical subcategory of the principle of distinction—the
obligation of belligerents to distinguish between combatants and
noncombatants—it is conceptually distinct.11 The principle of distinction requires
that a belligerent not aim at an illegitimate target. Proportionality, on the other
hand, limits the conditions under which the trigger can be pulled even when that
bullet (or bomb) is heading toward a legitimate target. Indeed, adherence to the
principle of proportionality may require military forces to expose themselves to
greater risk in order to avoid excessive collateral damage.12
Given the vast variety of combat circumstances, a single detailed explication
of proportionality would be unworkable.13 By necessity, the principle is general
and, by some commentators’ lights, irretrievably vague.14 Nonetheless,
international law purports—primarily in the Rome Statute and the Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Convention—to provide a definition of proportionality
that guides military behavior and serves as a legal and moral standard of
accountability for states in general, and military commanders in particular, during
armed conflicts. A degree of ambiguity is to be expected for such an expansive
10

ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶ 19 (June 13, 2000). See also
Commentary on the HCPR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare,
http://ihlresearch.org/amw/Commentary%20on%20the%20HPCR%20Manual.pdf (“[W]hen a
military objective is attacked, and expected collateral damage is assessed compared to the anticipated
military advantage, the proportionality analysis also needs to take into account the expected
collateral damage to the natural environment.”).

11

Sloane, supra note 8, at 311. (“[T]he truth is that proportionality . . . .imposes a more onerous, and
qualitatively distinct, constraint: arguably, it requires military forces to subject their forces to greater
risks of death and injury in an effort to reduce collateral damage.”).
See, for example, David Luban, Risk Taking and Force Protection, in READING WALZER 277 (Itzhak
Benbaji & Naomi Sussman eds., 2013).
As William Fenrick puts it, the problem is not whether or not the principle exists, “but what it
means and how it is to be applied.” William Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable
Offence, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 539, 545 (1997).

12

13

14

W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 173 (1990) (“By American domestic
law standards, the concept of proportionality [in the law of armed conflict] would be
constitutionally void for vagueness.”).
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legal principle. But the fact that the current legal status of proportionality is so
befogged is in part attributable to the fact that international tribunals have not yet
provided direct case law on the topic.15 Which definition of proportionality
constitutes CIL remains an open question. As is discussed Section II(A)(2) below,
this means that the binding law for many of the world’s largest and most conflictprone nations is currently unknown.
Escalating violence around the world16 underscores the importance of
developing a sound understanding of the legal principle of proportionality. Ideally,
proportionality could be defined in such a way that both reflects and reinforces a
genuine international consensus and is also sensitive to the realities of twenty-firstcentury battlefields. This Comment’s approach is informed by a decided
skepticism about a morally aspirational approach to international humanitarian
law that does not adequately grapple with geopolitical and military realities. The
increasing proportion of civilian casualties in modern conflicts17 in particular
underscores the importance of clarifying the legal liability for the war crime of
disproportionate force so that the norm of proportionality exerts real influence in
current and future military operations.
Proportionality as a principle of international law is understood to function
at two levels: state liability and individual criminal liability for military
commanders. Both the academic and international legal communities have
grappled in recent years with this conceptual distinction18—some arguing that
there should be no distinction at all. The central focus of this Comment, however,
concerns the definition of CIL regarding individual liability, though the analysis
may contain implications for how CIL should be understood with respect to state
liability.

15

See Bartels, supra note 6, at 272 (pointing out that “no case law exists to which the International
Criminal Court (ICC) . . . could turn were it to be seized of a case concerning alleged
disproportionate attacks”).

16

Death Toll in 2014’s Bloodiest Wars Sharply Up on Previous Year, PROJECT FOR THE STUDY OF THE 21ST
CENTURY,
https://projects21.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/death-toll-in-2014-62415-update1.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
In World War I, civilians represented approximately 15% of deaths. In World War II that
percentage dramatically increased to 65%, and in recent conflicts the proportion has risen yet again
to over 84%. See Douglas H. Fischer, Comment, Human Shields, Homicides, and House Fires: How a
Domestic Law Analogy Can Guide International Law Regarding Human Shields Tactics in Armed Conflict, 57
AM. U. L. REV. 479, 484 n.30 (2007) (citing EDMUND CAIRNS, A SAFER FUTURE: REDUCING THE
HUMAN COST OF WAR 17 (1997)).
George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur
Case, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 539, 542 (2005).

17

18
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A. Current
State
of
International Law

Proportionality

in

Customary

1. The historical origins of proportionality.
The origins of proportionality provide the necessary backdrop for
understanding its prevalence as a state practice and legal norm. Historical
scholarship varies in identifying the specific date that proportionality emerged
alongside necessity and distinction as a core feature of the laws of armed conflict.19
The contemporary iteration of proportionality in its focus on preventing civilian
losses, however, is of relatively recent vintage. Current historians maintain that the
modern concept of proportionality emerged sometime in the 1970s.20
The development of the principle of proportionality in the second half of
the twentieth century followed the advent of high altitude bombing as a tactic of
war, which brought the population into the battlefield in a way that had not
typically been true of historical wars.21 In past conflicts, when noncombatants
were killed in war, it was typically because they were either targeted, victims of a
fairly unusual accident, or broadly targeted as a class, such as in the case of a
siege.22 When the axis and allied powers of World War II began deploying high
altitude nighttime aerial bombing raids, they were not (necessarily) targeting
noncombatants, but nonetheless the strikes incurred a severe human toll.23 Indeed,
the now ubiquitous term “collateral damage” was coined in the post-War period.24
What should be made of this? While it is true that proportionality is
conceptually separable from the principle of distinction, the development of
proportionality was motivated by the same underlying concern—protecting
civilians from the machinations of war. Proportionality as a doctrine, however,
was formulated as a response to a particular set of historical circumstances.
Current articulations of the principle should thus bear in mind that the
proportionality was crafted as a consequence of a recognition that abstract
principles—in this case the principle of distinction applied to novel historical
settings of high altitude aerial bombing—can fail to fulfill their intended purposes.
19

20
21

22
23
24

See Judith Gail Gardham, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 391, 394–403;
see also A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 17 (2d ed., 2004).
See ROGERS, supra note 19 at 208–09.
Gardham, supra note 19 at 400 (“With aerial warfare, civilians became extremely vulnerable and
were inevitably collateral targets, potentially on a much larger scale than previously. Henceforth,
the primary focus of proportionality was to be in relation to civilian losses.”).
See ROGERS, supra note 19.
Id.
Collateral damage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/collateral%20damage (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
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As will be discussed infra in Section IV(C) advocates of applying the most
expansive formulation of the proportionality principle in asymmetric conflicts
may be missing the crucial lesson that principles need to be adapted to
circumstances.

2. The current scope of proportionality in customary international law.
While the definitions of proportionality contained within the AP I and the
Rome Statute bind the signatory states to those treaties for the scope of activities
specified in the treaties,25 CIL is the only source of legal accountability for
proportionality violations for a broad range of military activity undertaken by
nations. Significant non-signatories to AP I (for example India, Israel, Pakistan,
and the U.S.) have declared that they are bound by the AP I only insofar as it
reflects CIL.26 This may be a distinction without a difference, as the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) maintains that the AP I definition of
proportionality is binding as CIL,27 though others have expressed skepticism
about the ICRC’s claim.28
Which definition of proportionality is binding as CIL—if either—is also
important because CIL legally binds all nations.29 Additionally, very little positive
treaty law regarding proportionality has legal force with respect to noninternational armed conflicts, such as the ongoing conflict in Syria. The AP I
applies only where regular armed forces engage the regular armed forces of a
foreign state or enter the territory of a foreign state without permission. 30 Thus,
the aborted attempt by American forces to rescue diplomatic personnel from Iran
in April of 1980 would qualify as an international armed conflict, but ongoing
NATO operations in Afghanistan conducted with the permission of the Afghan
government would not. The Rome Statute is likewise limited with respect to noninternational conflicts. The Rome Statute only offers applicable law for the war
crime of disproportionate force in international armed conflicts.31 Thus, for any
judicial body determining the legal accountability for a military commander
25

26

27

Though this statement is qualified by the fact that many AP I signatories included qualifying signing
statements. See infra note 36.
See Samuel Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric Warfare? Part I: Defender Duties under International
Humanitarian Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 425, 428 (2011).
Customary
IHL,
INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE
OF
THE
RED
CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14 (last visited Feb. 16,
2016).

28

Parks, supra note 14, at 173 n.526 (pointing out that the United States has not conceded that
proportionality as defined in AP I is customary international law).

29
30

See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHT 236–48 (2d ed., 1982).
Fenrick, supra note 13, at 98.

31

Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8(2)(e)(i).
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charged with a proportionality violation as a part of the NATO coalition in
Afghanistan, the only relevant international law will be CIL. Only Common
Article 3 of the 1949 Convention and Additional Protocol II of the Geneva
Convention—neither of which makes reference to proportionality—have legal
force with respect to non-international armed conflicts.32
Additionally, many major countries are not signatories to the AP I or the
Rome Treaty—such as India, China, the United States, Russia, etc. All of these
countries, however, are bound by CIL.33 Proportionality, as it is established in CIL,
then, constitutes the only the binding law of proportionality for states governing
at least two billion people, virtually all nuclear weapons, and many of the most
active militaries. Because the definition of proportionality in CIL is ambiguous,
for many of the countries that are likely to be involved in non-international
conflict, (arguably the conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sri
Lanka, to name just a few, all qualify in some respect as non-international
conflicts), the matter of which principle of proportionality, if any, is binding is up
for grabs.34

3. Defining proportionality within customary international law.
Granting the importance of determining CIL, it follows that all of the
plausible definitions of proportionality should be considered. The following
represent the realistic candidates for CIL proportionality as a war crime:
a) The AP I definition without qualification. This appears to be the position of
the International Committee of the Red Cross in its study of CIL proportionality.35
Under the grave crimes doctrine, this would mean that even the domestic courts
of the United States, China, India, and Israel should hold their military
commanders criminally liable for conduct within the scope of the AP I definition.
b) The AP I definition with qualification. Perhaps the most technically accurate
assessment of international legal practice would endorse this option. A great many
signatories to the AP I included signing statements that qualified their assent to
the open-textured language of Article 51(5)(b).36 Moreover, the fact that the U.S.,
32

GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR
120–21 (2010).

33

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) cmt. j
(1986).

34

See the hypothetical explored in Section I.
Customary IHL, supra note 27.

35
36

International Committee of the Red Cross, Australia’s Reservation to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
I), 8 June 1977, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument
&documentId=10312B4E9047086EC1256402003FB253 (Australia’s signing statement insisting
that military advantage in art. 57 refer to military advantage “as a whole” and that the judgment of
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India, Israel, and Pakistan have refused to sign onto the AP I and have indicated
that their compliance extends only to CIL indicates that they see some gap
between the AP I and CIL with respect to proportionality.37 The difficulty is in
pinning down some definition that can capture the multitudinous formulations,
signing statements, actual state practices, etc.38 If we expect CIL to constitute a
reasonably clear and administrable rule, then a “rule” including the various
formulations of proportionality found in the interstices of the AP I and the Rome
Statute seems an implausible candidate for CIL.
c) The Rome Statute. Using the Rome Statute as the CIL definition of
proportionality has the benefit of being a clearer and more administrable rule. But
using the Rome Statute as CIL also has this advantage over using the AP I: Article
120 disallows states to make reservations to the Statute.39 As a consequence, the
123 signatories to the statute are committed unequivocally to the definition
provided therein.40 Moreover, once the effect of signing statements on the AP I
definition is considered, the result starts to look in many cases like the definition
provided in the Rome Statute.41 Therefore, the Rome Statute serves as a genuine
common denominator between signatories to both.
d) None of the above. While it is possible to imagine a CIL proportionality
regime that prohibits more military conduct than the AP I (strict liability for
civilian casualties, for instance) or less military conduct than the Rome Statute,
these alternatives are significantly less plausible as candidates for CIL than those
outlined above.42 The former may be desirable, as a normative matter. But it is too
far out of step with actual state practice to be a realistic account of CIL. A CIL
definition of proportionality more permissive than the Rome Statute, meanwhile,

military commanders is necessarily ex ante); International Committee of the Red Cross, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's Declaration to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June
1977,
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument&docu
mentId=0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2 (the United Kingdom expressing the same
reservations); consider, for example, the cumulative effect of statements (c) and (i) made by the UK
on ratification. See also Parks, supra note 14, at 174 (stating that, in reviewing a draft of AP I during
negotiations, the U.S. Department of Defense concluded that the concept of proportionality was
not a customary rule of law as presented in the draft).
37
38

39

Estreicher, supra note 26, at 428.
Aaron Fellmeth, Proportionality Principle in Operation: Methodological Limitations of Empirical Research and
the Need for Transparency, 45 ISR. L. REV. 131–33 (2012).
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 120. (“No Reservation may be made to this Statute.”).

41

Id.
See SOLIS, supra note 32.

42

For an implicit rejection of both options, see infra Section IV.

40
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would be dramatically at odds with the international community’s understanding
of the relationship between CIL and international humanitarian law. 43
This section has provided an overview of the historical background and
current scope of proportionality in international law, as well as the potential future
options for CIL proportionality. The only viable options involve the total or
partial adoption of either the AP I or Rome Statute definitions of proportionality.
The task of Section III will be to analyze the difference between the AP I and
Rome Statute definitions of proportionality before arguing in Section IV for the
adoption of the Rome Statute as proper definition of proportionality in CIL.

III. T HE D IFFERENCES B ETWEEN THE R OME S TATUTE A ND
G ENEVA C ONVENTION R EGARDING P ROPORTIONALITY
Article 51(5)(b) of the AP I prohibits attacks which “may be expected to
cause” injuries or damage to civilians “which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” as violations of the
proportionality principle.44 The Rome Statute by contrast, offers a different
definition of proportionality violations, prohibiting attacks “intentionally
launch[ed]…in the knowledge that such attack will cause” injuries or damage to
civilians “which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
overall military advantage anticipated.”45 Though the two definitions are
structurally similar, the terms of the Rome Statute create a higher threshold mens
rea, specifically through the additional requirements of intention and knowledge.
Moreover, the Rome Statute definition requires injury or damage to civilians that
is clearly excessive rather than merely excessive in the AP I definition. Lastly, the
Rome Statute measures the degree of injury or damage to civilians in relation to
“the concrete and direct overall military advantage” (emphasis added).46 The
deliberate inclusion of the term “overall” indicates a greater degree of flexibility
in the proportionality calculation.

A. The Differences Between the Definitions
Recent scholarship has suggested that there is little practical difference
between the AP I and Rome Statute definitions.47 The analysis below argues that
43

44

It is considered settled that the rules of International Humanitarian Law have been incorporated as
a part of CIL. U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
AP I, supra note 5, art. 51(5)(b).

46

Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
Id.

47

Sloane, supra note 8, at 309.

45
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this conclusion is incorrect. Taken seriously as legal standards, the difference in
the AP I and Rome Statute definitions could have broad and deep implications in
the laws of war.
First, the different functions of the Rome Statute and the AP I need to be
clarified. The Rome Statute was drafted as a means of providing individual
criminal liability for violations of international crimes over which the International
Criminal Court (ICC) asserts subject matter jurisdiction, including war crimes,
crimes against humanity, genocide, and crimes of aggression.48 The AP I,
meanwhile, serves largely as a prescriptive, action-guiding document that lays out
step-by-step instructions for commanders and soldiers to respect international law
while engaged in military conduct.49 But the AP I has a grave breach provision
that obliges signatory nations to repress and treat as war crimes certain violations
of the AP I.50 Thus while the Rome Statute and the AP I serve different general
purposes as legal regimes, both have a retrospective criminal law function.
As a preliminary matter, the text of the AP I may not contain a freestanding
grave breach provision regarding proportionality. Article 85, which outlines the
criteria for grave crimes, seemingly includes proportionality by making explicit
reference to the language of proportionality as it is defined in Article 57. However,
the reference to Article 57 is preceded by the following language, “launching an
indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the
knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life . . . .”51 Thus, a lawyer
defending an alleged war criminal accused of a proportionality violation under the
AP I could very well argue that only indiscriminate disproportionate attacks qualify as
grave breaches. As noted above, the crime of indiscriminate military conduct is a
related but conceptually distinct grave breach. Proportionality violations generally
presuppose that the military commander is discriminating between combatants
and noncombatants, but asks the further question of whether the anticipated harm
to noncombatants of a given attack is justified in light of the anticipated military
advantage to be gained. By limiting criminal liability for proportionality to the
universe of indiscriminate attacks, this reading of the AP I diminishes the legal
basis upon which a tribunal could act to convict military commanders who used
disproportionate force.
On the whole, the AP I is generally read to create more liability for
proportionality violations than the Rome Statute, but at least in this respect, a
major difference between the two could be that the AP I is entirely lacking a grave
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Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 5 (a)–(d).
Adil Ahmad Haque, Protecting and Respecting Civilians: Correcting the Substantive and Structural Defects of
the Rome Statute, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 519, 523 (2011).
See AP I, supra note 5, arts. 85(3)(b), 85(5).
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AP I, supra note 5, art. 85(3)(b).
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breach provision regarding proportionality qua proportionality. This textual
difficulty notwithstanding, the AP I’s grave breach provision is broadly
understood to include violations of proportionality regardless of the question of
discrimination.52
Another place where the elements of the war crime of a proportionality
violation differ between the Rome Statute and the AP I is in their respective mens
rea requirements. Under Article 85 of the AP I, for a violation of proportionality
to qualify as a “grave breach,” it must be willful and done with knowledge.53 The
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia applied this language
and interpreted “willfully” in the context of war crimes as “incorporat[ing] the
concept of recklessness, whilst excluding mere negligence, and therefore that [t]he
perpetrator who recklessly attacks civilians acts ‘willfully’.”54
The Rome Statute, in contrast, requires a showing of knowledge. The
material and mental elements for proportionality violations are as follows:
1. The perpetrator launched an attack.
2. The attack was such that it would cause incidental death or injury to
civilians . . . and that such death [or] injury . . . would be of such an extent as
to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated.
3. The perpetrator knew that the attack would cause incidental death or injury
to civilians . . . and that such death [or] injury . . . would be of such an extent
as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated.55

Taken in combination with the plain language of Article 8(b)(2)(i)-(iv), the Rome
Statute raises the bar for criminal liability by requiring evidence of both intention
(in launching the attack) and knowledge (of the proportionality violation). The
mens rea requirement of knowledge is a source of doctrinal difficulty and raises
questions of whether knowledge should be assessed subjectively (the defendant
knew) or objectively (the defendant should have known). Some scholars have
argued that the Rome Statute’s mens rea requirement of knowledge can be
52

Haque, supra note 49, at 525–26.

53

AP I, supra note 5, art. 85(3)(b). (“[T]he following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches of this
Protocol, when committed willfully, in violation of the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and
causing death or serious injury to body or health . . . (b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting
the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss
of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph
2(a)(iii).)(emphasis added).
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Prosecutor v. Stanislav Gali, Case No. IT-98-29, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 54 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj
031205e.pdf.
U.N. Preparatory Commission for the Int’l Crim. Ct., Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of
Crimes, Art. 8(2)(b)(i), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/I/ADD.2 (Nov. 2, 2000).
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expanded to include an unreasonable erroneous belief about factual circumstance,
thus “objectifying” the knowledge requirement and lowering the bar for liability
to include conduct that was done with a reckless or negligent state of knowledge.56
However, this reading is rendered implausible by the presence of Article 30 of the
Rome Statute which states that “[u]nless otherwise provided, a person shall be
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction
of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and
knowledge.”57
Another important distinction with respect to mens rea is that the Rome
Statute’s formulation indicates that proportionality liability is necessarily an ex ante
question. As such, the inquiry into liability focuses on the decision of the military
commander rather than the effect of the attack, while the AP I formulation has
been interpreted to include a results-oriented, ex post analysis.58 Because of the
unpredictable nature of conflict in real time, there are doubtless attacks that appear
to be disproportionate ex post that were not disproportionate ex ante.
Consequently, an ex post analysis would likely affect the legal outcome in
adjudications of the war crime of disproportionate force. This distinction could
also have serious ramifications for drafting military policy and for the potential
behavior of military commanders,59 and could therefore change the decisionmaking calculus of those potentially liable for a proportionality violation—for
better or worse.
Another salient distinction between the Rome Statute and the AP I
definitions of proportionality can be seen in the Rome Statute’s “clearly excessive”
language preceding “overall military advantage” where the AP I says only
“excessive.” The limitation of proportionality liability to cases of clearly excessive
56

ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 290 (2d ed. 2008) (“This erroneous belief
about factual circumstances must be based on reasonable grounds or in other words not be specious
or far-fetched. More specifically, the mistake must not result from negligence.”).
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Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 30; see also Haque, supra note 49, at 532–33 (concluding, after
reviewing several attempts to loosen the mens rea requirement of the Statute with respect to
proportionality that, “The Rome Statute does not prohibit reckless or negligent attacks on civilians,
only intentional and knowing attacks on civilians, and this remains the case even if negligence and
recklessness are relied upon as evidence of intent”).
See, for example, HCJ 769/02, The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel et
al., ¶ 46, 54 [2006] (Isr.) (Justice Aaron Barak of Israel’s Supreme Court arguing that targeted killing
operations should be subject to both ex ante and ex post investigation, citing to the precautionary
obligation introduced by the AP I definition of proportionality).
Lest there be skepticism that military commanders are concerned with legal standards in the heat
of war, it should be mentioned that in situations of targeting, military lawyers are normally involved
in the target selection process. See, for example, Leonardo Tricarico, Identification of Targets and
Precautions in Attacks in Air Warfare: Operation Allied Force as a Case Study, in PROTECTING CIVILIANS
IN 21ST CENTURY WARFARE: TARGET SELECTION, PROPORTIONALITY, AND PRECAUTIONARY
MEASURES IN LAW AND PRACTICE 39–44 (Mireille Hector & Marine Jellma eds., 2001).
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force opens a range of possible justifications for a particular attack; this appears
to be have been a deliberate choice by the drafters.60 As a scholar studying the
differences between the definitions has noted: “[t]he word ‘clearly’ implies a
margin of appreciation, such that only in cases where the disparity between
military advantage and collateral damage is somewhat gross and obvious will the
offence have been committed.”61 The significance of this terminological
difference in practice can be seen in the contrast between the ICC Office of the
Prosecutor’s handling of allegations of proportionality violations by coalition
forces in Iraq in 2006 and the U.N. Goldstone report applying the AP I definition
of proportionality to Israeli attacks in “Operation Cast Lead.”62 In the former case,
the Office of the Prosecutor justified not initiating an investigation partially on
the following grounds:
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) draws on the principles in Article 51(5)(b) of the 1977
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention, but restricts the
criminal prohibition to cases that are “clearly” excessive . . . with respect to
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) allegations, the available material with respect to the alleged
incidents was characterized by . . . a lack of information indicating clear
excessiveness in relation to military advantage.63

The U.N. Goldstone Report, in contrast, concluded that Israeli attacks
targeting Hamas police constituted a disproportionate use of force under the AP
I definition of proportionality even though:
the Mission has earlier accepted that there may be individual members of the
Gaza police that were at the same time members of the al-Qassam
Brigades . . . [e]ven so, the Mission concludes that] the deliberate killing of 99
members of the police at the police headquarters and three police stations . . .
failed to strike an acceptable balance between the direct military advantage
anticipated (i.e. the killing of those policemen who may have been members
of Palestinian armed groups) and the loss of civilian life (i.e. the other
policemen killed and members of the public who would inevitably have been
present or in the vicinity).64
60

61
62

63

64

A.P.V. Rogers, The Principle of Proportionality, in THE LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE 189, 208–
09 (Howard M. Hansel ed., 2008) (by [the Rome Statute’s] use of the words “clearly excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated,” the drafters of this article
took into account the various statements made on ratification of Protocol I and, by adopting a
middle way, have tried to accommodate the requirements of military necessity without abandoning
humanity, by allowing one to look at the bigger operation picture) (emphasis added).
WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 97 (2012).
See Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Rep. of the U.N. Fact-Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 12th Sess., Sept. 25, 2009, U.N. Doc A/HRC/12/48 (2009)
[hereinafter Goldstone Report].
ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Letter to Senders Concerning the Situation in Iraq, 5–6 (Feb. 9, 2006),
available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/04D143C8-19FB-466C-AB77-4CDB2FDEB
EF7/143682/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
Goldstone Report, supra note 62, ¶¶ 436, 629.
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The Report allows that an acceptable balance can be struck, but gives no
indication that a “margin of appreciation” ought be given to the military
commanders.65 While these two instances of alleged proportionality violations
were undoubtedly distinct in many ways, it is clear that the decision by the Rome
Statute’s drafters to render only those attacks that are clearly excessive in relation
to the overall expected military advantage limits the realm of liability for
disproportionate use of force.

B.

Implications of the Definitional Difference

Perhaps most importantly for the modern military era, the difference in
definitions has an effect on the legality of military responses to the use of human
shields in asymmetrical conflict. While the Rome Statute does not provide carte
blanche permission for attacks on targets with human shields, its definition
certainly expands a military commander’s latitude in such engagements relative to
the AP I’s definition.66
As noted above, the intent element of the Rome Statute’s definition of a
proportionality violation changes the analysis of a commander’s decision, raising
the bar of liability. However, while liability is less expansive under the Rome
Statute’s definition, an attack on a human-shielded target could meet the definition
of “intentionally launching an attack with knowledge that such attack will cause”
injury or damage to civilians. While this formulation may protect commanders in
situations where it is unclear whether or not human shields are being used, just
looking to the mens rea requirements, the Rome Statute and the AP I may yield
the same conclusion on a prototypical human shield case.
A more categorical difference, however, may emerge with regard to the
inclusion of “overall military advantage” language in the Rome Statute.67 This
language uniquely invites a consideration of what tactics are appropriate in light
of a broader view of the conflict. First, commanders facing human shields can
argue that not being able to fire upon targets shielded by civilians provides their
foe an enormous tactical advantage of immunity from retaliatory attack. Showing
that the inability to target militant positions renders a battle unwinnable or a
broader military campaign unachievable could offer compelling grounds for
allowing, at least in limited circumstances, attacks on human shielded targets.
Second, it may be argued that a policy of consistently firing upon military targets
with human shields will protect more civilians, because it will reduce or remove
65

Id.
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Amnon Rubinstein & Yaniv Roznian, Human Shields in Modern Armed Conflicts: The Need for a
Proportionate Proportionality, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 126–127 (2011) (arguing that
proportionality should be read more expansively to permit, under certain circumstances, strikes
against targets protected by human shields).
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Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8(2)(e)(i).
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the incentive for opposing militants to use human shields as a battle tactic. If the
foregoing is true, it raises a possible argument for granting commanders latitude
to attack human shielded targets grounded in the secondary effects doctrine of
proportionality. The secondary effects doctrine of proportionality requires
military commanders to take into consideration not only immediate harms, but
broader harms such as depriving a population of access to potable water or
electricity. If a secondary effect of strenuously avoiding incidental harm to civilians
is an enhanced incentive on the part of insurgent forces to use human shields,
then an overly strict definition of proportionality could itself be
disproportionate.68
The AP I definition provides less of an opening for flexible application of
the proportionality principle in light of asymmetric conflict. By expanding mens
rea liability to recklessness and localizing the calculation of the overall military
advantage gained by a strike, the AP I formulation makes deliberate strikes against
human shields difficult, if not impossible, to justify.69
These distinctions matter because while the principle of proportionality is
itself vague, there is evidence that the principle, and thus its formulation, has a
concrete affect on military strategy.70 For example, U.S. military planners at the
outset of the first Gulf War, in order to comply with international law of armed
conflict, followed a multi-step protocol that required: 1) an analysis of whether a
target was legitimate; 2) whether a legitimate target would result in the
disproportionate use of force; and 3) whether the weapon proposed for the target
would result in disproportionate force.71 Lest one think that such a process
amounts to little more than a paperwork hurdle, multiple targets were declined
because of proportionality concerns.72 The language used in international law is

68

I do not argue for such a conclusion here. Any argument that did attempt to reach a conclusion
along these lines would require an intensely empirical demonstration of how the incentives of
insurgents would change in light of greater proportionality latitude in attacking human shields.

69

See Goldstone Report, supra note 62, ¶ 435.
See, for example, Implementing Limitations on the Use of Force: The Doctrine of Proportionality and Necessity, 86
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 39, 42 (1992) (remarks of Fred Green, Counsel of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff) (Stating that the principle of proportionality is “well-understood and play[s] a very real role
in decision making within out government generally and within the Department of Defense—the
military establishment, specifically”). But cf. II INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLUME II: PRACTICE (Jean-Mariet Henckaerts & Louise
Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (quoting Russian’s view that proportionality is the “weakest point of
IHL” and that states do not, in fact, comply with it in any meaningful sense).
Ariane L. DeSaussure, The Role of the Law of Armed Conflict During the Persian Gulf War: An Overview,
37 A. F. L. REV. 41, 59–61 (1994).
U.S. Dept. of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, (Wash. D.C., GPO,
Apr. 1992), http://www.ssi.army.mil/!Library/Desert%20Shield-Desert%20Storm%20Battle%
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reflected in national and military law, including even the law of nations that are
non-signatories.73 The heightened bar of liability under the Rome Statute could
very well affect the outcome of legal proceedings. For all the reasons stated above,
it is clear that there are significant differences between the Rome Statute and the
AP I definition of proportionality. Those differences have the consequence that
the AP I’s definition would hold more military conduct liable for the war crime of
disproportionate force than would the Rome Statute’s definition.74

IV. R OME S TATUTE P R OPORTIONALITY A S C USTOMARY
I NTERNATIONAL L AW
A consideration of proportionality through doctrinal and realist frameworks
shows that the Rome Statute’s definition of proportionality should be regarded as
CIL.

A. Doctrinal Framework
1. First principles of customary international law.
CIL is traditionally defined as follows: “[i]nternational jurists speak of a
custom when a clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions has grown up
under the aegis of the conviction that these actions are, according to international
law, obligatory or right.”75 The Statute of the International Court of Justice more
tersely defines CIL as a “general practice accepted as law.”76 Though there is a vast
and discordant literature on what constitutes international custom as a source of
international law, it is broadly agreed that CIL involves 1) some convergence or
regularity in practice among states; 2) that convergence of practice is necessary,
but not sufficient to constitute custom; 3) that there must be convergence of
deliberate practice, not induced by force, fraud, or mistake; and 4) that the
deliberate and volitional practice must be accompanied by a certain attitude, belief,
intention, or disposition, which is called opinio juris.77 This final element, often
called the “psychological” element of demonstrating CIL, proves to be the

20Analysis/Conduct%20of%20the%20Persian%20Gulf%20War%20-%20Final%20Rpt%20to
%20Congress.pdf.

76

Id.
Which perhaps encourages a preexisting tendency in the media to claim war crime violations; see id.
at 730–32.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, vol. I, § 17 (8th ed. 1955); see also North Sea Continental Shelf,
1969 I.C.J. 44 (Feb. 20).
See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 38(1)(b).

77

See FINNIS, supra note 29, at 238.
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trickiest.78 But as a legal formula, a practice by nations becomes a rule of CIL when
it is accepted by nations as stemming from a sense of legal obligation rather than
as an exercise of policy making discretion.79
However, this formulation of CIL presents further problems when one
attempts to determine if a particular practice or principle qualifies as CIL. For
instance, does it matter if nations have recognized a legal obligation by explicitly
codifying the principle, but violate the principle in practice?80 Some courts have
answered that a CIL prohibition on torture can exist while acknowledging at the
same time that torture is an ongoing practice in many countries.81 Moreover, just
how universally accepted must a practice be before it can qualify as CIL? 82
Canvassing all 190 or so of the world’s nations at one time is a difficult proposition
and has not been required for the establishment of CIL.83 Frequently, statements
by government officials or ratification of a treaty that contains a legal norm that
is similar to the proposed CIL norm will suffice as a demonstration of opinio
juris.84

2. Treaties.
The doctrinal approach to CIL is typically defined as a “customary practice
of states followed from a sense of legal obligation.”85 123 nations are states party
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.86 The AP I has 174
signatories, though 40 of the signatories attached signing statements qualifying the
assent a signature would otherwise provide.87 As an example, Canada’s signing
statement explicitly qualifies the AP I definition of proportionality by stating that
78
79

80

81
82
83
84
85

86

87

See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 7–9 (4th ed. 1990).
See, for example, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1990) (“By an ancient usage among civilized
nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international law, cost fishing
vessels . . . have been recognized as exempt . . . from capture as a prize of war”).
This is a difficulty, in particular, for those who argue that prohibitions against torture is a rule of
CIL. See Mark Weisburd, Customary International Law and Torture: The Case of India, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L.
81 (2001).
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 822 (2d Cir. 1980).
See BROWNLIE, supra note 78, at 5–6.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, supra note 81, at 822.
See BROWNLIE, supra note 78, at 7.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 33,
§ 102(2).
International Criminal Court, The States Parties to the Rome Statute, https://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome
%20statute.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
International Committee of the Red Cross, Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties,
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties
&xp_treatySelected=470 (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
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“military commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon or
executing attacks have to reach decisions on the basis of the information
reasonably available to them at the relevant time and that such decisions cannot
be judged on the basis of information which has subsequently come to light.”88
Therefore, if the quantity of signatories to the respective treaties is taken as
evidence of broader opinio juris for the AP I definition, that conclusion is
undermined by the reservations expressed by signatories.

3. State practice.
Looking for general state practice on the battlefield is a problematic
undertaking. First, it is not clear that a practice contrary to a potential CIL
principle is relevant when there is broad opinio juris.89 Second, military practices
and disciplinary procedures for commanders are notoriously opaque.90
Nonetheless, working with the imperfect information that is available, the ICRC’s
study of CIL proportionality established that states almost universally accept the
wisdom of the proportionality principle as a matter of public policy.91 Yet the
study did not reveal a universal consensus regarding how states interpret and
operationalize the proportionality principle92—which is essential to determining
whether the AP I’s definition of proportionality is generally practiced.
Scholar A.P.V. Rogers’ review of the history of proportionality and its
predecessor concepts in the late 19th and early and mid-20th century concludes
that even in cases where the AP I definition has been technically employed as the
basis of CIL, courts have included mens rea requirements.93 Rogers concludes that
the Rome Statute’s definition of proportionality provides a far better account of
the historical and current state of CIL than the AP I definition.94
There is also a purely analytical reason that state practice supports the Rome
Statute. The Rome Statute’s definition of proportionality is more likely to be a
basis for CIL because of its more limited scope. Logically, every military act that
violates the Rome Statute’s definition of proportionality also violates the AP I
definition. In that respect, the two definitions are co-extensive. But violations of
88

89
90
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International Committee of the Red Cross, Canada’s Reservation to the Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
Notification.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=172FFEC04ADC80F2C1256402003FB3
14 (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 75.
Fellmeth, supra note 38.
Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, supra note 70, at 48–49, 58–59.
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Fellmeth, supra note 38.
Rogers, supra note 60, at 147.
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Id. at 148.
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proportionality as defined by the AP I do not necessarily violate the Rome
Statute’s definition. To the extent that there is support in state practice and opinio
juris for the AP I definition, it works as support for the Rome Statute, but not
vice versa. Assuming state practice generally deviates downward from the AP I
definition of proportionality, the Rome Statute version of proportionality has a
greater degree of support as CIL.

B.

Realist Framework

While the doctrinal approach is ostensibly the method by which courts
determine CIL, academic commentators have observed that in reality courts rarely
attempt to genuinely satisfy the doctrinal elements of CIL.95 Instead, judicial
practice with respect to CIL evinces disinterest in an empirical canvassing of state
practice. Courts often conflate practice with opinio juris or disregard an absence
of state practice when opinio juris is present. Courts also appear to selectively
employ materials to demonstrate CIL, and occasionally even hold that CIL is
binding while acknowledging that the traditional criteria are absent.96
Recent prominent scholarship on the topic of CIL advances the thesis that
CIL is, on its own terms, a fiction.97 On this view, courts do not really attempt to
determine universal practices or opinio juris98 To support this supposition scholars
cite the assumption by courts in CIL formation that the silence of nations in light
of a declared CIL is evidence of the validity of the norm.99 In reality, many nations
are not aware of these putative customary laws unless and until their interests are
directly affected by them, making a mockery of the legal principle that consent
without knowledge is impossible.100 Scholars advancing this view of CIL as nonconsensual point to the practice of judges establishing new CIL on the basis of no
more than mere analogy to the principles of non-binding treaties.101
Notwithstanding these observations, CIL jurisprudence is faithful to its first

95

96
97
98

See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 469 (2000)
(“[T]he . . . [ICJ], in most cases, declares rules of law without investigating the attitude of states on
the legal character of a customary norm or undertaking an investigation of the actual practices of
the majority of states.”).
Id. at 469–79.
Id.
Id.

100
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Id.
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principles in some respects, such as in the case of diplomatic immunity.102 But for
CIL skeptics, this is just the exception that proves the rule.
Beyond arguing that CIL jurisprudence does not take its own doctrine
seriously, recent scholarship by Professors Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner has
endeavored to provide a realist, functional explanation of CIL. They argue that
CIL regarding human rights and laws of armed conflict is in truth a mere collection
of the promulgated preferences and interests of powerful nations.103 Moreover,
those preferences are subject to enforcement only when the costs for the powerful
nations are low relative to the gains in enforcement. This, they argue, explains the
difference in the willingness of the U.S. to impose human rights based sanctions
on Myanmar and Cuba on the one hand, while China and Saudi Arabia are free
from such sanctions. Meanwhile international treaties and covenants, when
effective, are best explained through game theory as a solution to the prisoner’s
dilemma.104 But CIL does not work within the game theory framework. Because
it derives its force from the practices and legal obligations of nations absent any
coordination or negotiation between parties, CIL lacks the strategic basis of, for
instance, the policy of diplomatic immunity.
An alternative, but not mutually exclusive account of CIL suggests that CIL’s
function is emotive and value-laden.105 This approach may make more sense of
CIL than a focus on the mutual self-interest of states under the Westphalian model
of international law. The function of “codifying” these values as international law
would be to “brand” outlier states—say those states that tolerate slavery or
torture—in a way that creates both a deterrent and a potential basis for coercive
measures such as sanctions.106
Taking both of these views together—that CIL is the promulgation of the
preferences of the powerful, and that those preferences may be emotionally or
morally motivated efforts to negatively brand nations that deviate from core moral
principles—we gain a clearer sense of the realist view of CIL.107 However, the
102

A sentiment echoed by other skeptics of CIL; see generally Samuel Estreicher, Rethinking the Binding
Effect of Customary International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 5 (2003).

103

Eric Posner & Jack L. Goldsmith, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113,
1132 (1999).

104

Id. at 1175.
Estreicher, supra note 102, at 11. An acknowledgement of the effect that moral appeals in domestic
politics can have in the formation of international law is not contrary to realism. See Stephen D.
Krasner, Realist Views of International Law, 96 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING (AM. SOC.
OF INT’L L.) 265, 266 (2002).
Estreicher, supra note 102, at 11–12.
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For this Comment’s purposes, an extended treatment of “realism” is not necessary. But a realist
account means roughly an approach that explains and predicts state behavior based solely on the
distribution of power. See KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).

Summer 2016

265

Chicago Journal of International Law

picture gets more complicated. Powerful nations are far from a homogenous
group. Some nations with outsized military and economic power do not evince
the emotive, value-laden desire to brand human rights violating “outliers” (for
instance, China). Meanwhile, other nations with significant economic clout and
less military influence are politically invested in the political project of branding
moral outliers (Germany).108
To determine which definition is more likely to qualify as CIL under the
realist lens, we must ask which practices are favored by global powers, and would
not place undue restrictions on the ability of those nations to act in their selfinterest. But as noted above, this requires some disaggregation.
In realist terms, powerful nations without an investment in the political
branding project, such as China, prefer to adopt as few limitations on their military
conduct as possible. A limitation may be justified only if some other benefit—
such as avoiding the costs associated with being branded as a human rights
violator—outweighs the harm of reduced military discretion. Clearly, this group
of countries would prefer the Rome Statute formulation of proportionality to the
AP I definition. For many of these countries it is consistent with their internal
policies, such that the Rome Statute comes at little to no cost.109 For others, it may
require a tightening of military policy, but the lost military discretion is made up
for by the avoided losses of being branded an “outlier” in the human rights regime.
The military practice of some nations may be significantly curtailed by the Rome
Statute, and as such they may wish there were no proportionality in CIL
whatsoever. But as between the AP I and the Rome Statute, the Rome Statute’s
formulation of proportionality is a far likelier candidate for adoption as CIL
among this class of countries.
Those nations that are largely inactive on the military stage, but whose
domestic politics emphasize moral and emotional concerns do not face significant
costs by the adoption of AP I as CIL. The Rome Statute definition of
proportionality is more likely to garner support from this power center as well.
Part of the reason for this is that these nations are economically and militarily
interdependent with militarily active nations that also share the moral
108
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commitment to branding outliers (for example the U.S., U.K., and Australia) but
they would nevertheless resist the adoption of an overly stringent definition as
CIL.110
Meanwhile, powerful countries will not enforce something that binds them,
and the AP I’s definition has the potential to bind the activities of many of the
world’s active military powers.111 The Rome Statute, on the other hand, while
providing a real constraint, is not so vague as to open military operations up to
broad condemnation unless military commanders are clearly operating outside the
normal rules of engagement.
This is particularly true as nations look to the future of conflict during the
twenty-first century. Asymmetric conflict presents unique strategic, tactical, and
moral challenges for modern militaries.112 The conflicts are often waged outside
of traditional battlefield settings. Non-state belligerents are typically ununiformed
and make efforts to blend in with non-combatants. As noted above, insurgents
actively use the civilian population tactically in order to immunize their bases of
attack from reprisals.113 The Rome Statute definition of proportionality is well
formulated to adjust to these changing realities. In particular, it could more
plausibly justify direct reprisals against targets with human shields, which may be
necessary to diminish the tragic tactical advantage gained by belligerents through
the use of human shields.114
The Rome Statute approach to proportionality is also more likely to garner
broad buy-in and actually impact domestic, political decisions—an important
realist consideration. There is evidence that international human rights law can
have an impact on the development of internal practices, even without an external
enforcement mechanism.115 A frequent element of international human rights laws
that fail to accomplish anything more than symbolism is a combination of
excessive ambition and ambiguity.116 The Rome Statute definition of
proportionality, in contrast to the AP I, creates criminal liability for a more
restricted and less ambiguous range of military behavior. Consequently, the Rome
110
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Statute is less likely to face widespread opposition117 and stands a better chance of
changing internal policies and practices with respect to proportionality.

C.

Policy Considerations

Having argued that, as a descriptive matter, the Rome Statute’s approach to
proportionality is a more plausible CIL candidate on both doctrinal and realist
grounds, the next question is whether, as a normative matter, this is a positive
development. The conclusion reached by this Comment is that it is, largely
because the Rome Statute enables asymmetrical war to be more effectively and
humanely prosecuted.
a) Efficacy. The more permissive Rome Statute definition of proportionality
will render military operations more effective. There is no doubt that, relative to
the AP I definition, the Rome Statute definition of proportionality expands the
range of military conduct that is permissible under CIL. However, a strong case
can be made that giving militaries more tactical latitude can harm the ultimate
success of the mission.118 This is particularly true in military engagements where
gaining the trust and cooperation of the domestic population is an essential
condition for victory. Look no further than General Stanley McCrystal’s decision
to unilaterally tighten the “Rules of Engagement” for NATO coalition troops in
Afghanistan for evidence that a restriction on military choices can be strategically
advantageous.119
Yet several considerations suggest that, on balance, the relative
permissiveness of the Rome Statute allows for more effective military
engagements. First, while there are circumstances that may call for a military to
impose strict proportionality rules of engagement on itself in order to serve
particular goals, such as increased goodwill among the domestic population, those
circumstances will vary, even within in specific operational contexts. There is a
difference between, for instance, trying to ensure goodwill in a district that has
historically resisted the Taliban, such as the non-Pashtun northern regions of
Afghanistan, and trying to ensure goodwill in a region like Kandahar, the
population of which is more supportive of the Taliban. The strategic advantage
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of more or less restrictive proportionality rules of engagement would likely differ
in a commander’s approach to these regions. If effectively implemented, the AP I
definition of proportionality, and in particular interpretations of its broad language
that expand liability, would undoubtedly affect military behavior.120 As a
consequence, military commanders would work from a more limited tactical
toolbox.121 Insofar as we can expect military commanders to be the best situated
and incentivized actor to pursue the most efficacious tactics, and given the vast
variety of circumstances individual commanders face, it stands to reason that the
greater the number of tactical tools available, the greater the chances of an
effective approach.122
Additionally, there is reason to believe that restrictive proportionality
regimes lend critical support to insurgencies. Restrictive proportionality regimes
effectively immunize areas imbued with civilians from attack, thus presenting
insurgents—who are often strategically incapable of winning in open battle—an
attractive point from which to launch attacks.123 In the event that military forces
simply abstain from attacking those areas, the insurgent forces have gained a
significant tactical advantage. But if the military forces do attack, even in a limited
way that tries to reduce civilian casualties, the insurgent forces can count a tactical
loss as a strategic win because of the civilian losses. Under the AP I definition, the
military commander may well be held out as a war criminal.124 Because
insurgencies often seek to delegitimize the ruling government over the long term,
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these condemnations can present a greater victory than assassinations, acts of
terror, or military confrontation.125
b) Humanity. The Rome Statute’s definition of proportionality, if accepted as
CIL, will better ensure the protection of civilian lives than the AP I. This position
may seem counterintuitive, but is rendered plausible by considering the following
factors: 1) clarity; 2) enforceability; and 3) participation. The Rome Statute
definition of the war crime of disproportionate use of force provides clarity for
the legal prosecution of the war crime and corollarily provides guidance to military
commanders. Knowingly attacking targets that would be reasonably viewed as
clearly and obviously failing to balance military advantage against civilian losses
may not create a bright line, but it does create a legal standard that lines up with
an unambiguous and strong moral intuition. Military commanders aware of the
legal standard of the Rome Statute would both have reasonable discretion to
conduct military operations and be incentivized, when presented with information
indicating the possibility of civilian harm, to stop and consider the magnitude of
the damage in relation to the military advantage.
Yet it could be that increased clarity in what constitutes a proportionality
violation will only serve as a roadmap for evasion. When commanders suspect
that they are approaching or planning an attack that might present serious
proportionality concerns, one might worry that commanders would deliberately
reduce the amount of information accepted about the target so as to avoid the
“knowledge” mens rea required under the Rome Statute.
Though this is a possibility, several practical considerations militate against
the widespread practice of deliberate evasion. First, military commanders would
need just enough information to know that there are proportionality concerns,
but not too much that the commander would qualify as having knowledge of the
potential civilian losses. If such an epistemic space exists, it is very small indeed.
Moreover, it is doubtful that many commanders would feel confident that they
are occupying it when making consequential decisions. Secondly, military
commanders have a multitude of reasons for wanting as much intelligence as
possible regarding a potential target.126 Commanders want to be sure of the
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enemy’s location in targeting an attack, so as not to waste resources or risk military
personnel unnecessarily. And for reasons stated above, commanders are often
independently motivated to avoid excessive civilian casualties for strategic
reasons.127
In terms of enforceability, the Rome Statute’s definition of proportionality
has several advantages over the AP I definition. Though courts ought always to
feel some discomfort in evaluating the real time decisions of military commanders
from the comfort of a courtroom, proportionality is particularly challenging in
that it requires a comparison of two distinct qualities: military advantage against
harm to civilians.128 While the quantity of harm to civilians can be calculated by
some objective measure, the quality of “military” advantage that justifies the risk
of killing 20 as opposed to 70 civilians is almost non-judiciable. No artificial
formula can answer this question (as some courts have found out).129 Given that
fact, the Rome Statute definition provides jurists with a less ambiguous legal
question. The Rome Statute’s inclusion of a clear mens rea requirement and a
margin for appreciation make the legal task more manageable. Therefore, when
the criminal elements are present, they more likely to be undertaken with
confidence and vigor by prosecutors and courts.130
There is a threshold question of which of the two definitions stands a better
chance of exerting influence on military conduct. Because of the buy-in advantage
of the Rome Statute outlined above,131 it seems likely that if either standard
achieves widespread legitimacy in regulating military conduct, it would be the
Rome Statute’s definition. Endless discussion of the merits and demerits of a more
stringent proportionality regime is ultimately meaningless if the legal standard is
met with indifference or hostility by nations and their militaries. The greatest flaw
of the AP I definition of proportionality can be seen in the signing statements of
so many of the signatories.132 Nations simply are not willing to constrain their
military conduct to the extent that the AP I definition of proportionality would
prescribe.133 As such, it remains a morally aspirational standard, which, however
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pleasing to its authors and advocates, undermines its own chance to guide military
conduct.
The Rome Statute’s definition, meanwhile, presents a legal standard that can
command broader and deeper support.134 For a nation to refuse to hold its military
to the Rome Statute definition of proportionality is tantamount to saying openly
to the international community that that nation reserves the right to purposefully
and knowingly attack targets when the damage to civilians clearly outweighs the
overall military advantage to be gained. That is, simply stated, a politically—not to
mention morally—untenable position, and one that few countries are likely to
take. The Rome Statute definition, then, can function as a broadly supported
common denominator for military conduct.

V. C ONCLUSION
This Comment has shown that the distinctions between the AP I and Rome
Statute matter for international law because the international law of
proportionality affects the way wars are evaluated and ultimately fought.
Furthermore, this Comment has argued that the Rome Statute’s less capacious
reading of proportionality liability better meets the relevant criteria for what
qualifies as customary international law. Lastly, this Comment has suggested that
this descriptive state of affairs has advantages that may be welcomed as a
normative matter.
Laws of war must not be too aspirational, lest they become little more than
morally self-congratulatory gestures that lack purchase during conflicts.
Aspirations declared in peacetime international meeting rooms are too easily
disregarded under the pressure of war. Those who would bemoan this
development as an evisceration of the traditional principle of proportionality must
remember that proportionality was created to grapple with a specific set of
historical circumstances, and so it is entirely appropriate for the application of the
principle to adjust in light of a new form of conflict. Yet the concern of those who
advocate for a more restrictive proportionality does not fall upon deaf ears; it is
of profound importance that the rule of proportionality does not become so
permissive that it describes military operations without delimiting them. By
acknowledging that this law of armed conflict must straddle the Scylla of
aspiration and the Charybdis of cynicism, we can see that in the laws of war, efforts
must constantly be made to correctly calibrate long-standing moral principles to
transient legal and military realities.
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